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Documentation Index

Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://help.rytz.com.au/llms.txt

Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

This is legal information, not legal advice. This page is reviewed against the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021, and current case law on AustLII — but not by a practising family-law solicitor. For advice on your matter, see Free legal help in Australia — Legal Aid, Community Legal Centres, Justice Connect, Women’s Legal Services, and Aboriginal Legal Services offer free or low-cost help.
Statutes set the framework. Cases fill in what the framework actually means in practice. This page covers the landmark family-law cases the court relies on most often — what each established, the line it sits on, and where the platform surfaces it.

Property — the s79 framework

Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52

The headline: Before the court alters property interests under s79, it must first ask whether it is just and equitable to do so at all. Not every separation requires a property settlement. Why it matters: Stanford reframed the s79 process. The court can’t just jump to dividing the asset pool — there’s a threshold question about whether interference with existing property interests is even appropriate. The platform: Stanford is the foundational case for the Settlement Planner’s Step IV (Just & Equitable analysis).

Mallet v Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605

The headline: Long relationships move toward equality of contribution. Even where one party brought more in financially, the longer the relationship, the more the contributions argument shifts toward equality. Why it matters: The starting point in long-relationship cases is closer to 50/50 than disparities in initial contributions might suggest. Mallet is constantly cited in Step II (Contributions Assessment).

Pierce v Pierce [1999] FamCA 1314

The headline: Contributions are weighed on a holistic basis — financial + non-financial + parental + homemaker — not just by who put what cash in. Why it matters: A parent who left the workforce to care for children doesn’t have a “smaller” contribution. Pierce framed the modern approach to parental + homemaker contributions.

Polonius & York [2010] FamCAFC 228

The headline: Significant initial contributions get discounted by the length of the relationship. The longer you’ve been together, the less weight a $400k pre-relationship deposit carries. Why it matters: The Settlement Planner’s contributions assessment uses Polonius reasoning when one party brought significantly more capital into a long relationship.

Singerson & Joans [2014] FamCAFC 238

The headline: Post-separation appreciation in asset value can be relevant to the contributions assessment if one party’s contributions during separation drove the increase.

Bonnici v Bonnici [1992] FamCA 86

The headline: Initial contributions can erode over time as joint contributions accumulate. The “erosion principle”.

Kowaliw v Kowaliw [1981] FamCA 70

The headline: Negative contributions — wastage, gambling, deliberate destruction of asset value — can be brought to account in the contributions assessment. Why it matters: Where one party has materially diminished the asset pool, the court can adjust accordingly. The Settlement Planner has a wastage-flagging mechanism that draws on Kowaliw.

McCalman & McCalman [2016] FamCAFC 138

The headline: Section 75(2)(c) — care of children — is a substantial future-needs adjustment. The parent with primary care of dependent children typically receives a significant uplift.

Williams v Williams [1985] FamCA 26

The headline: Future-needs disparity (income, age, capacity) drives meaningful adjustments under Step III.

Kennon v Kennon [1997] FamCA 27

The headline: Family violence during the relationship can reduce the perpetrator’s contributions assessment where the violence made the victim’s contributions significantly more arduous. Why it matters: A specific carve-out in the contributions framework that recognises FV’s impact on the contributions one party was able to make.

Parenting — the children’s-best-interests line

M & M [1988] HCA 68

The headline: The “best interests of the child” test in parenting matters is paramount and overriding. The court should not focus on what is fair to the parents. Why it matters: M & M is the foundational case for s60CA. Every subsequent best-interests case sits on top of it.

McCall & Clark [2009] FamCAFC 92

The headline: Post-separation parenting arrangements should be assessed against the developmental needs of the child at each stage, not frozen at the time of orders. Why it matters: The case-law foundation for review windows in the parenting plan (clause 11). What works for a 4-year-old often doesn’t work for a 14-year-old.

Goode & Goode [2006] FamCAFC 1346

The headline: Interim parenting orders are made on a different evidentiary basis to final orders — the court works with the limited information available and prioritises stability. Why it matters: If you’re applying for interim orders, the court is not making findings about who’s at fault — it’s making the best-interests call on the information at hand.

Rice v Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725

The headline: Final parenting orders should not be revisited unless there has been a significant change in circumstances since the orders were made. Why it matters: This is the threshold codified in s65DAAA in 2024. The Rice v Asplund readiness checker (in Beyond the Plan) assesses whether your facts meet the threshold.

Marsden v Winch [2007] FamCA 1364

The headline: Marsden refined the Rice v Asplund test. A change in circumstances must be both significant and material to the children’s welfare.

SPS v PLS [2008] FamCAFC 16

The headline: Variation applications based on the children’s evolving needs (turning teen, starting secondary school) can satisfy the Rice v Asplund threshold even without a “dramatic” change.

Family violence

Stradford & Stradford [2019] FamCAFC 25

The headline: Contravention of parenting orders without reasonable excuse triggers the s70NAC–NBF penalty pathway. The seriousness of the contravention determines the remedy.

Childers & Leslie [2008] FamCAFC 5

The headline: Repeated contravention of contact orders — even where each individual breach is minor — can amount to “serious disregard” for the orders.

Goldsmith & Brennan [2017] FamCAFC 35

The headline: Contumacious contravention (deliberate, in conscious defiance of orders) attracts the most serious end of the contravention remedies, including imprisonment.

How to read these cases

You don’t need to read the full judgments. The platform’s AI briefings cite them where relevant, and the strategic briefing surfaces which cases are likely to be cited against your matter. If you do want to read them, AustLII (austlii.edu.au) has every reported case free. Search by the citation (e.g. [2012] HCA 52) or the names.

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Glossary

Every acronym + term you’ll encounter on the platform and in proceedings.

Key statutes

The 12 sections of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that come up most often.